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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
-vs-
MARVIN ARTHUR POWELL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 19068 
This is a criminal case in which defendant was charged 
by Information with Attempted Theft By Receiving and Carrying a 
Concealed Dangerous Weapon. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Jury found defendant not guilty of the charge of 
Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon, but returned a verdict of 
guilty of the charge of Attempted Theft By Receiving. Based 
thereon, the court entered its Judgment and Sentence on February 7, 
1983. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Judgment and an order 
directing the District Court to dismiss the charge of Attempted 
Theft By Receiving brought against him in this action. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The appellant and his co-defendant, Earl Cushing, were 
jointly charged by Information with Attempted Theft By Receiving, 
a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated, Title 
76-6-408. The appellant was also charged in a Second Count with 
the crime of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon, a Third Degree 
Felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated, Title 76-10-504. The 
court granted defendant Cushing's Motion for Acquittal at the close 
of the evidence at the trial, and the case was submitted to the Jury 
on the two charges pending against Mr. Powell. A verdict of not 
guilty was returned on the weapons charge, but the Jury found him 
guilty on the charge of Attempted Theft By Receiving. 
For purposes of this action, the parties have entered into 
a Stipulation of Facts which reads as follows: 
1. On April 12, 1982, the defendant was charged by 
Amended Information with the crime of Attempted Theft By Receiving, 
a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated, Title 
76-6-408, in that said defendant did attempt to receive, retain or 
dispose of the property of Jack Hales knowing that it had been stolen, 
or believing that it probably had been stolen, with a purpose to 
deprive the owner thereof. (R.56) 
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2. On or about May 19, 1982, defendant filed his Motion 
To Quash and Dismiss Count I of the Amended Information (dealing 
with the charge of attempted theft by receiving) on the ground that 
the acts of the defendant did not constitute the offense of Attempted 
Theft By Receiving because one of the essential elements of the crime, 
that of attempting to receive stolen property, was not present when 
the alleged offense occurred. That motion was denied by the court. (R.61: 
3. At the conclusion of the State's case, and at the con-
clusion of the evidentiary portion of the trial, the defendant made 
oral motions for acquittal on grounds that the State had failed to 
establish one of the essential elements of the crime, that of attempt-
ing to receive stolen property. Those motions were denied by the court. 
4. The stolen property referred to in the Amended Informa-
tion consisted of two horses that were sold to the defendant on 
October 20, 1981, by Charles P. Illsley, an undercover police officer 
employed by West Valley City. 
5. The horses that were sold to the defendant by Officer 
Illsley were not stolen. They were owned by Jack Hales, who loaned 
them to the West Valley City Police Department on October 20, 1981, 
for the purpose of making the transaction with the defendant. 
6. At the outset of the trial, the attorney for the State of 
Utah conceded that the horses were not stolen, and testimony throughout 
the trial consistently showed that the horses were never stolen. 
7. The trial judge refused the defendant's request that the 
jury be instructed that one of the essential elements of the crime is 
that the property must be stolen when it is received by the defendant. 
(R.163) Instead, the trial judge instructed the jury that one of the 
elements of the crime is that defendant did receive or retain the 
horses believing that they probably had been stolen. (R.114) 
8. The jury found the defendant guilty of the charge of 
Attempted Theft By and Judgment on the verdict was entered 
by the court on February 7, 1983. (R.184-5) 
I: 
I 
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9. The sole issue to be determined by the Supreme Court 
on appeal is whether the subject property (horses in this case) 
must actually be stolen before the defendant can properly be con-
victed of the crime of Attempted Theft By Receiving, in violation 
of Utah Code Annotated, Title 76-6-408. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO DISMISS THE CHARGE OF ATTEMPTED 
THEFT BY RECEIVING AND IN INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY THAT THE OFFENSE IS COMMITTED 
EVEN THOUGH THE SUBJECT PROPERTY HAS 
NOT ACTUALLY BEEN STOLEN. 
The charges against the defendant arose out of a "sting" 
operation conducted by the West Valley City Police Department. 
Defendant was arrested when he purchased two horses from the undercover 
office who negotiated the transaction. The horses had never been 
stolen, they had just been borrowed by the officer for use during the 
"sting" operation. Defendantwas subsequently charged with Attempted 
Theft By Receiving, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated, Title 76-6-408. In pre-trial motions and throughout the 
trial, defendant's attorney repeatedly moved to dismiss the action on 
grounds that one of the essential elements of the crime, that of 
attempting to receive stolen property, was not present when the alleged 
offense occurred. The court consistently held that the subject propertv 
need not be of stolen character before defendant could be convicted of 
the crime of Attempted Theft By Receiving. The trial judge instructed 
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the Jury that if one receives or retains property of another believ-
ing that it probably has been stolen, the offense is committed even 
though the property has not, in fact, been stolen. Based on previous 
Utah cases, the defendant asserts on this Appeal that the trial judge 
erroneously instructed the Jury and improperly refused to dismiss 
the case. 
The issue on this Appeal is the same as that raised by the 
defendant in the trial court. The court must answer the question of 
whether the property received by the defendant (horses in this case) 
must actually be stolen before defendant can properly be convicted of 
the crime of Attempted Theft By Receiving, in violation of the charging 
statute. 
The relevant portion of Utah Code Annotated, Title 76-6-408, 
which is the charging statute in this instance, reads as follows: 
RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY--DUTIES OF PAWNBROKERS.-- (1) A 
person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of 
the property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or 
believing that it probably has been stolen, or who conceals, 
sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or withhold-
ing any such property from the owner, knowing the property to 
be stolen, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof. 
The above statute was amended into its present form when the 
revised Utah Criminal Code was adopted in 1973. This court has pre-
viously considered at least three cases which deal with the present 
language of the statute. The most recent of these is State v. Murphy, 
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617 P.2d 399. In that case the Supreme Court of Utah reversed 
defendant's conviction under the statute because the prosecution 
had failed to prove an unlawful purpose at the time of defendant's 
possession of the alleged stolen vehicle. In discussing the elements 
of the crime, the court stated as follows: 
"Implicit in the language of the statute are the basic 
elements of the crime: (1) property belonging to another 
has been stolen; (2) the defendant received, retained or 
disposed of the stolen property; (3) at the time of receiv-
ing, retaining or disposing of the property the defendant 
knew or believed the property was stolen; and (4) the 
defendant acted purposely to deprive the owner of the 
possession of the property. 
Before the defendant can be convicted of the crime of 
receiving stolen property the prosecution must present 
a quantum of evidence sufficient to establish each element 
of the crime." 
In a footnote referring to element number (1), the court 
stated, "This requirement is fundamental to the offense." 
Another case decided by this court which involved the 
receiving statute is State of Utah v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229 (1980). 
In that case the court was dealing with the charge of concealing or 
aiding in the concealment of stolen property, but the principles 
laid down by the court apply to all cases arising under the statute. 
After quoting the language of the statute, as we have done above, 
the court listed the elements of the crime as follows: 
"(l) property belonging to another has been stolen; 
(2) the defendant aided in concealing this property; 
(3) at the time he so aided in concealing it he knew 
the item had been stolen; and (4) his purpose in acting 
was to deprive the owner thereof of possession. For a 
criminal conviction, the prosecution must prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt each element of the crime." 
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It appears that this court has twice stated that one 
of the essential elements of the crime of receiving stolen property 
is that the property belonging to another has been stolen. The 
entire basis for the offense, historically and fundamentally, is 
that the property actually be stolen. The purpose of the statute 
is to apprehend those having stolen property in their possession 
where no evidence exists as to the identity of the actual thief. 
There is no basis in law or in fact for the conviction of persons 
who purchase property that is not stolen. The language of the 
statute that states "or believing that it probably has been stolen," 
refers only to the requirement of knowledge on the part of the 
accused that the property was stolen. It disposes of the defense of 
the accused that he did not know that the property was stolen and 
makes him equally culpable if he believes that the property was 
stolen. This language does not change the basic requirement that the 
property be in fact stolen before he can be convicted of the theft 
charge. 
On this issue, the Utah cases are not unlike the holdings 
of other States. In 66 Am. Jur.2d, Receiving Stolen Property, §7, 
Page 298, we find the following general language pertaining to this 
issue. It reads as follows: 
"An essential element of the offense of receiving stolen 
property is that the property received must be stolen 
property. A previous theft of the property, with all the 
elements of that offense, must affirmatively appear, and 
if it does not, or if the fact appears that the property 
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was not stolen, as where the original taking from the 
owner was without felonious intent or was not against 
his will or consent, the receiver is not guilty of 
receiving stolen property. Similarly, if at the time 
of the alleged offense the property, although previously 
stolen, has lost its stolen character through a recovery 
by the owner or otherwise, the receiver cannot be held 
guilty, even though he receives it believing it to be 
stolen property. Pursuant to these principles, it is a 
defense to a charge of receiving stolen property that the 
property was offered to the accused with the consent of 
the owner for the purpose of entrapment." 
Since the horses that were sold to Mr. Powell were admittedly 
not stolen, but were the rightful property of Mr. Jack Hales, who 
loaned them to the police for the purpose of selling them to Mr. Powell, 
one of the essential elements of the crime is missing, and the trial 
court should have dismissed the action or should have granted the 
defendant's Motion for Acquittal. 
The third case that has been decided by the Utah court since 
the Theft By Receiving statute was amended is State of Utah v. Sommers, 
569 P.2d 1110. The prosecution and the court erroneously relied upon 
this case to support the rulings made during the trial. 
In Sommers, the defendant claimed that the receiving statute 
violated the due process clause of the Constitution because the 
statute, under the law of Attempt, negated the defense of impossibility. 
He argued that when the statute precludes the defense of impossibility, 
then the right of fundamental fairness implied in the due process clause 
has been done away with. The court rejected the Constitutional defense 
of impossibility, relying upon outside authority. Then, in line with 
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the rejection of the defense of impossibility, the court stated as 
follows: 
"Thus exculpate defendant solely on the ground the 
television set he purchased was not, in fact, stolen 
property would shock the coomon sense of justice. The 
defense of impossibility is not a fundamental right 
essential to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty. 
The express abolition of such a defense advances the 
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which 
support all of our civil and political institutions. 
Defendant's assertion that he was convicted of the crime 
of conjuring up malevolent thoughts is without merit. 
His conviction was predicated on proof of his criminal 
purpose implemented by an overt act strongly corroborative 
of such prupose." 
The above statement by the court refers to the defense of 
impossibility and not about the of the crime of Theft By 
Receiving. No issue as to the elements of the crime was discussed 
or resolved in the Sommers case. 
The editors of West Publishing Company made a critical error 
in preparing the headnotes for the Sommers case. They indicated that 
the court had made a determination on the stolen property question by 
including the following headnote: 
"Fact that television set purchased by defendant from 
undercover agent was not stolen property did not preclude 
defendant from being convicted of attempt to receive 
stolen property. U.C.A. 1953, 76-4-101(3)(b)." 
Unfortunately, the language of the headnote does not correct-
ly reflect the language and holding of the court. The only thing the 
court decided in that case was that the defense of impossibility was 
not available to the defendant under the circumstances of the case. 
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The law of some of our surrounding states is similar to 
that laid down in the Lamm and Murphy cases. The Supreme Court 
of our neighboring State of Nevada has also adopted the principle 
that the first element of a charge involving stolen property is 
that the property must, in fact, have been stolen. In affirming a 
conviction for possession of a stolen camera, the court in Dutton v. 
State, 581 P.2d 856 (Nevada 1978), stated: 
"In order to sustain a conviction for possession of stolen 
property the State must show: (1) the property was in fact 
stolen, (2) the property was possessed by the accused with 
knowledge that it was stolen at the time of possession, and 
(3) the property was possessed by him with the feloneous 
intent of depriving the true owner of the property." 
A similar conclusion was reached in the case of Billings v. 
State, 650 P.2d 917 (Okla. Appeals 1982): 
"In a prosection for receiving stolen property, the State 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the property 
was in fact stolen; (2) that the accused was in possession 
of the stolen property; (3) that the defendant had actual 
knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that the property 
was stolen ... the state adequately showed, through direct 
evidence, that the truck was stolen and that Billings [the 
defendant] was found in possession of it." 
This same principle was followed in Lohman v. State, 632 
P.2d 430 (Okla. Appeals 1981) where the court affirmed a conviction 
for receiving stolen cattle. In the court's language, " ... all that 
need be shmm is that the property is in fact stolen, that the accused 
took possession of the stolen property, and that he knew or should 
have known that the property was stolen." 
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It is obvious thdt one of the basic elements of the 
crime of Attempted Theft By Receiving was missing in the case 
now before the court. The horses that were purchased by Mr. Powell 
during the "sting" operation conducted by the West Valley City 
Police Department were admittedly not stolen. Therefore, the court 
should have dismissed the case before it came to trial. In failing 
to grant Motions to Dismiss and Motions of Acquittal and instructing 
the Jury that the offense could be collllllitted even though the property 
was not actually stolen, the court collllllitted serious error which 
should be corrected by this court on Appeal. The court should reverse 
the judgment of the District Judge and should remand the case to the 
District Court for illllllediate dismissal of the charges. 
CONCLUSION 
For reasons set forth herein, the court should reverse the 
Judgment of the District Court and should order the dismissal of the 
case. 
P'!t... 
DATED of May, 1983. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBlUTTED, 
. ?! . J . 
ucU,.",_,_ 
H. RALPH MM 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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